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Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a 
given prize. The nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is 
driven by political considerations with a specific political culture. The main objective 
of this study is to analyze the effect of political culture and of valuation asymmetry on 
discrimination between the contestants. The weights assigned to the public well being 
and the contestants' efforts represent the political culture while discrimination is an 
endogenous  variable  that  characterizes  the  mechanism  allocating  the  prize.  We 
consider situations under which the optimal bias of the designer is in favor of the 
contestant with the larger or smaller prize valuation and examine the effect of changes 
in  the  political  culture  and  in  valuation  asymmetry  on  the  designer's  preferred 
discrimination  between  the  contestants.  Focusing  on  the  two  most  widely  studied 
types of contest success functions (deterministic all-pay-auctions and logit CSFs), we 
show that an all-pay auction is always the preferred CSF from the point of view of the 
contest designer. This result provides a new political-economic micro foundation to 
some of the most commonly used models in the contest literature.  
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1. Introduction 
Endogenous determination of contests may relate to all relevant elements of contests. 
This is obviously true with respect to the actions taken by the contestants.
2 There are 
institutional elements, however, that are typically determined by contest designers; 
economic and political entrepreneurs. Such characteristics include the contest prize,  
the set of contestants, the structure of multi-stage contests, caps on political lobbying 
and the contest success function.
3  
  Most of the literature on optimal contest design has focused on the choice of 
contest characteristics assuming that the designer's objective function depends on the 
contestants' efforts. Few attempts have been made to study the relationship between 
the designed contest and more general objective functions that take into account not 
only  the  efforts  incurred  by  the  contestants.
4  Examining  the  endogenous 
determination  of  public  policy  that  determines,  in  turn,  the  contestants'  prizes  or 
stakes,  Epstein  and  Nitzan  (2002),  (2006a),  (2006b),  (2007),  allow  the  designer's 
objective function to depend on the efforts of the contestants and on their expected 
aggregate  utility.  The  weights  assigned  to  these  variables  represent  the  political 
culture of the contest designers. 
  The  current  paper  departs  from  the  literature  in  three  ways.  First,  it  adds 
discrimination  to  the  contest  designer's  tool  box  containing  the  possible  means 
(control  variables)  to  enhance  his  interest.  Second,  it  applies  the  more  general 
objective function proposed in Epstein and Nitzan (2002), (2006a), (2006b) to study 
the relationship between discrimination and political culture. Third, it compares the 
two most widely studied types of contest success functions (all-pay-auctions and logit 
                                                 
2 Notably these actions include their efforts, Congleton, Hillman and Konrad (2008), Konrad (2009) 
and  to  their  decisions  to  enter  the  contest,  Morgan,  Orzen  and  Sefton  (2008).  Other  contest 
characteristics determined by the contestants are the contest coalition formation, Bloch et al. (2006), 
Sanchez-Pages (2007), and, within collective or group contests, the sharing rules of the prize among 
the group members, in case the prize is won, Baik (2008), Baik and Lee (2001), Nitzan and Ueda 
(2009), Ueda (2002).  
3 Glazer and Hassin (1988), Moldovanu and Sela (2001) and Nti (2004) deal with the contest prize, 
Baye et al. (1993), Amegashie (2000) and Taylor (1995) focus on the set of contestants, Gradstein 
(1998),  Gradstein  and  Konrad  (1999)  and  Amegashie  (2000)  examine  the  structure  of  multi-stage 
contests, Che and Gale (1998) study caps on lobbying and Nti (1997), (2004) and Kahana and Nitzan 
(2002) are concerned with the contest success function. 
4 Studying the endogenous determination of the optimal prize, Runkel (2006) and Singh and Wittman 
(1998) consider a designer's payoff function that depends on the performance of the contestants and on 
the difference in their winning probabilities (the closeness of the contest). This difference represents 
the uncertainty of the contest outcome that affects the interest it arouses and, in turn, the size of the 
contest  audience.  Dasgupta  and  Nti  (1998)  consider  the  endogenous  determination  of  the  contest 
success function, assuming that the designer's objective function depends on aggregate efforts and on 
his own valuation of the prize that may induce him not to award the prize.   2
CSFs) under optimal discrimination. Such comparison has previously been carried out 
assuming  either  no  discrimination,  Che  and  Gale  (1997),  or  some  given,  not 
necessarily optimal, discrimination, Epstein and Nitzan (2006b). Our main objective 
then is to analyze the effect of political culture and of asymmetry in the contestants' 
valuations  of  the  prize  on  discrimination  among  the  contestants  and  on  the 
comparison between all-pay-auctions and logit CSFs.  
  Discrimination is often controlled by contest designers and our initial task is to 
clarify why this is indeed the case in the complex institutional environments where 
real contests are held. We also wish to justify our focus on the two most widely 
studied  types  of  contest  success  functions.  Our  explanations  of  the  empirical 
relevance  of  the  particular  design  problem  on  which  we  focus  are  based  on  the 
economic and legal characteristics of the contest environment. 
  Many job openings and outsourcing of projects in the public sector need to be 
announced publicly in order to enable any interested potentially deserving candidate 
to take part in the contest on the position or project. By law, everyone is entitled to 
fair opportunity to take part and win the contest. However, each job or project has its 
specific  required  necessary  conditions.  These  conditions  are  part  of  the  contest 
requirements. The fact that the bureaucrat/regulator is responsible to determine and 
announce  these  requirements  implies  that  he  can  control  not  only  the  group  of 
contestants but, as in our abstract setting, give some candidate some known advantage 
over others. This is the basic reason why the bureaucrat is conceived as the contest 
designer. The designer can inform the contestants about the bias by stating, before the 
contest is held, the features that make a contestant advantageous (more likely to win). 
For  example,  the  designer  may  state  that  he  prefers  the  winner  to  have  a  strong 
financial  background  or  sufficient  administrative  experience.  Such  open  statement 
enables the designer to let the contestants know the bias in favor of one of them. 
However, this does not mean that the favored contestant certainly wins. It just means 
that the designer favors one contestant who is more likely to win if making the same 
effort as his rival. The bias is represented by the different values of a unit of effort 
made by the contestants. In the case of a conglomerate competing for a project, the 
designer  may  increase  the  winning  chances  of  a  different  small  group  by  adding 
specific  requirements  that  give  it  an  advantage  over  the  conglomerate.  He  may 
declare, for instance, that firms with green technology experience have an advantage 
in  the  contest.  In  such  a  case,  if  the  conglomerate  does  not  have  the  required   3
experience while the small firm does, the designer makes the contest less naturally 
biased in favor of the conglomerate (due to its size). By doing so, the designer can 
make the contest more equal (competitive) in order to increase the outlays of the 
contestants.  
  The legal right to conduct the contest and discriminate among the contestants 
by ensuring that the contest requirements are fulfilled affects the contest outcome and 
gives the contest designer a lot of power. This power can be used to promote the 
intended goal of the law (enhancement of the public welfare) or the designer's narrow 
objectives  (maximization  of  the  contestants'  efforts,  sewing  a  job  for  a  specific 
candidate). The empirical relevance of the problem of possible abuse of the designer's 
power is clear. Recent evidence from Israel can serve as an illustration. The 2007 
Israeli  State  Comptroller's  Report  refers  to  contests  designed  or  tailor-made  for 
specific  candidates,  as  well  as  to  conflicts  of  interest  or  biased  tenders  in  many 
projects  administered  by  the  Haifa  Port.  More  recently,  in  light  of  the  potential 
misconduct of a designer who can manipulate the required conditions to fit his own 
objectives, the Israeli Civil Service Commissioner's report from January 2010 warned 
that his office cannot supervise all of the (over one hundred) openings for which 
auctions were announced. Thus, some of the contests are biased in order to achieve a 
goal which is not the maximization of the likelihood that the opening is filled with the 
best candidate. In our study, such alternative goal is represented by the assignments of 
weight to the contestants' efforts. 
Note that, usually, discrimination is considered as one of the characteristics of 
the prevailing political culture or of the government's ideology. In contrast, in our 
contest setting, the weights assigned to the public well being and the contestants' 
efforts represent the political culture while discrimination is an endogenous variable 
that characterizes the mechanism allocating the prize which hinges on the political 
culture.  Put  differently,  discrimination  does  not  represent  the  contest  designer's 
preferences  or  an  imposed  constraint  of  the  political-economic  environment,  but 
rather the means he deliberately and selfishly applies to enhance his interest. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  law  allows  control  on  the  degree  of  discrimination 
among the contestants. On the other hand, however, it protects the contestants by 
ensuring  that their participation is  minimally effective; they have some  chance of 
"meaningful" winning if a contest is held. For this reason we restrict attention to 
competitive contest success functions. In particular, a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the   4
contestant  who  values  the  prize  more  highly  is  not  allowed  because  it  eliminates 
competition and "meaningful" winning. While the ability to bias by announcing the 
required conditions for participation in the contest is consistent with the reality of the 
contest  environment,  the  ability  to  choose  superior  yet  extreme  mechanisms  that 
eliminate  competition  and  meaningful  winning  are  inconsistent  with  the  basic 
existence of competition and real economic incentives that give rise to a contest that is 
beneficial for one or both of the contestants.
5 The two families of contest success 
functions on which we focus do conform to the reality of contests as well as to the 
legal  constraint  that  contests  are  meaningful.  They  can  also  be  justified  either 
axiomatically, in the case of Tullock lottery functions, see Clark and Riis (1998),
6 or 
on the grounds of common use in practice. In any event these families are the most 
widely studied types of contest success functions in the literature. 
  The  results  can  also  be  tested  empirically.  In  particular,  one  can 
empirically estimate the nature and extent of discrimination and  the  stakes of the 
contestants, and thus apply our results to expose the political culture inspiring these 
estimates. Consider the example of monopoly power  assuming that in a  series of 
contests the government decides who will be its single supplier of a certain “product”. 
In each period the contest designer publishes the terms of the contest and any firm 
that  satisfies  the  necessary  requirements  can  apply.  Various  parameters  of  this 
contest's environment can change over time: the contestants' stakes may change due to 
changes in the law that gives the winner more or less power and the contest designer, 
and,  in  turn,  the  political  culture  may  change  because  of  a  change  in  the  ruling 
political party. If the contest designer has not changed, then changes in the terms of 
the auction  imply  that discrimination  changes  due  to  a change  in  the  contestants' 
stakes. We could thus relate changes in the stakes to changes in discrimination or the 
contest terms. On the other hand, comparing different contests with similar stakes 
over different periods with different contest designers enables the use of the available 
panel data, using dummy variables to identify the different designers and time fixed 
effects, in order to relate changes in the terms of the contests to changes in political 
culture that reflect the different contest designers. Of course many other variables 
                                                 
5 In contrast to the situation where the designer proposes a 'take it or leave it' offer to the individual 
with the higher prize valuation, in our case, when there is no contest, the winner and not the designer 
enjoys the prize. If the designer prefers the existence of a contest, he cannot choose a mechanism that 
precludes the direct or indirect abolition of competition by exclusion of contestants.  
6 We use the same type of discrimination as in Clark and Riis (1998). 
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would  be  taken  into  account,  such  as  the  economic  state,  the  length  of  time  the 
designer is in power, etc. To sum up, such analysis can be carried using panel data for 
different contests over different periods of time when both the stakes and the contest 
designers have changed. This analysis can be useful in examining how changes in 
contest designers and changes in the contestants' stakes affect discrimination.  
  Our  first  two  results  specify,  in  a  two-contestant  setting,  the  optimal 
discrimination from the point of view of the contest designer corresponding to any 
given  combination  of  political  culture  and  asymmetry  between  the  contestants' 
valuation  of  the  prize.  These  results  enable  the  derivation  of  the  conditions  that 
determine whether the optimal bias is in favor of the contestant with the larger or 
smaller  prize  valuation  and  the  investigation  of  the  effect  of  a  change  in  these 
parameters on discrimination. They also lead to the conclusion that within our setting, 
where the logit contest success function does not exhibit increasing returns to scale, 
an all-pay auction is always preferred to a logit contest success function from the 
point  of  view  of  the  contest  designer.  This  conclusion  provides  a  new  political-
economic micro foundation to some of the most commonly used models in the contest 
literature.  
 
2. Optimal contest design 
2.1 The setting 
In the basic one-stage contest setting, there are two risk-neutral contestants, the high 
and  low  benefit  contestants,  1  and  2.  The  prize  valuations  of  the  contestants  are 







= ≥ . Being chiefly 
concerned with the conditions under which the contest designer chooses an optimal 
contest, we assume that he has full knowledge of the contestants’ prize valuations. 
Given  these  valuations  and  the  CSF,  ) , ( Pr 2 1 x x i ,  the  function  that  specifies  the 
contestants’ winning probability given their efforts  1 x  and  2 x , the expected net payoff 
of contestant i is: 
                          ( ) i i i i x n x x u E − = ) , ( Pr 2 1 ,  (i=1,2)      (1) 
As  in Epstein and Nitzan  (2006b, 2007), let the objective  function of the contest 
designer in our extended setting be a weighted average of the expected social welfare 
and lobbying efforts:   6
                              [ ] ( )( ) 2 1 2 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( x x u E u E G + − + + = ⋅ γ γ       (2) 
where the parameters  γ  and  ( ) γ − 1  are the weights assigned to the expected social 
welfare and the contestants’ lobbying outlays. These weights represent the political 
culture; the culture reflected by the designer's genuine objectives or the culture that 
imposes this objective function on the designer. The designer is assumed to maximize 
the objective function (2) by setting the CSF, given the Nash equilibrium efforts of 
the contestants.  His  particular  choice  of  the  CSF  together  with  the  corresponding 
efforts of the contestants constitute the equilibrium of the extended contest.  
As in Epstein and Nitzan (2006b), the designer decides whether there is a 
contest on the prize or not. If there is no contest, he awards the prize to the individual 
with the higher prize valuation and no efforts are made by the potential contestants. 
Note that in contrast to the situation where the designer proposes a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer to the individual with the higher prize valuation, in our case, when there is no 
contest, the winner and not the designer enjoys the prize. If the designer prefers the 
existence  of  a  contest,  he  has  to  ensure  a  genuine  competitive  environment  that 
precludes the direct or indirect abolition of competition by exclusion of contestants
7, 
as explained in the introduction. We therefore focus on the widely studied contests 
with interior equilibria that are based on all-pay-auctions and on logit CSFs. 
 
2.2. All-pay auctions  
In our setting, certain winning means that the designer sets a CSF that leaves no 
residual winning uncertainty (RWU) after the revelation of the contestants' efforts. 
That is, the CSF for  0 > δ  is an all-pay auction given by:   
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and for  0 = δ ,  ( ) 1 , 2 1 1 = x x p , where the discrimination variable  0 ≥ δ  is selected by 
the contest designer. By (3), a reduction in δ  increases the bias in favor of the more 
motivated contestant 1. Furthermore,  1 0 < ≤ δ  implies a bias in favor of contestant 1, 
with an extreme bias when  0 = δ  (contestant 1 is the certain winner - the prize is 
                                                  
7 For example, by applying a CSF that is always unresponsive to their effort, as in Nti (2004).    7
awarded to the individual with the higher prize valuation). When  1 = δ  the contest is 
fair, there is no bias. When  1 > δ  the bias is in favor of contestant 2. 
The contest designer maximizes his objective function (2) by setting δ , given 
the  contest  success  function  which  is  of  the  form  given  by  (3)  and  the  Nash 
equilibrium efforts of the contestants. 
 
2.3. The logit lotteries  
The widely studied contest success function of the logit form for  0 > δ  is:  









= .           (4) 
and for  0 = δ ,  ( ) 1 , 2 1 1 = x x p , where again  0 ≥ δ  is selected by the contest designer. 
In this case, α  can be viewed as the effect of a real unit of investment on the winning 
probability of a contestant. We make the standard assumption that the marginal effect 
of effort on the winning probability is fixed or declining. That is,  1 0 ≤ <α . While α  
is  a  given  parameter,  the  designer,  again,  controls  the  institutional  bias  δ   when 
maximizing his objective function specified in (2). Our assumption that  1 0 ≤ <α  is 
warranted since, for any  1 ≥ k  and  0 > δ  (when  0 = δ  there is no competition), the 
second order conditions of the designer's problem are only satisfied when  1 0 ≤ <α  
(see proof of proposition 2 in the Appendix). The interpretations of the values that δ  
can take are the same as in sub-section 2.2. 
Whether a contest is held or not, crucially depends on the parameters k ,α and
γ  as pointed out in Epstein and Nitzan (2006 b). In particular, no contest is held and 
the prize is awarded to the contestant with the higher prize valuation, when  5 . 0 > γ . 
Whenever a contest is held, our concern is focused on how the exogenous parameters 
k and γ  determine the optimal bias in favor of one of the contestants.
8 In particular, 
who is that contestant and how is the bias affected by changes in these parameters. 
The answer to these questions is not transparent because a change in k and γ  might 




                                                 
8 Note that in Epstein and Nitzan (2006b) discrimination is not a control variable of the designer.   8
3. Optimal discrimination 
The  contest  designer  controls  the  institutional  bias  or  the  extent  of  the  desired 
discrimination  0 ≥ δ . The first preliminary result specifies the optimal discrimination 
* δ  chosen by the designer under the all-pay auction; the first type of CSF on which 
we focus. 
 
Proposition 1: Under the all-pay-auction, the optimal value of discrimination is equal 
to  k =








 , and  0
* = δ , otherwise.  
 
Under an all-pay-auction, the contest is deterministic. In turn, the behavior of the 
contest  designer  is  binary:  for  low  values  of  γ ,  k =
* δ ,  which  means  that  the 
designer is (incompletely) in favor of contestant 2. For high values of  γ ,  0
* = δ , 
which means that the designer is (completely) in favor of contestant 1. This result can 
be explained in the following way. For low values of γ , the designer wishes to extract 
the  maximal  efforts  from  the  contestants.  Setting  the  optimal  bias  k =
* δ  
accomplishes the designer's attempt to maximize the extent of competition between 
the contestants. In fact, such bias eliminates the advantage of contestant 1 and creates 
actual equality between the competitors. While this bias completely eliminates the 
contestants' surplus (the utility of each contestant is zero), it maximizes their efforts 
and since  γ  is low, it maximizes the designer's utility. For high values of  γ , the 
designer  wishes  to  maximize  the  total  utilities  of  the  contestants.  He  does  so  by 
setting the optimal bias  0
* = δ , which means that contestant 1 gets the prize and no 
efforts are made by the contestants, so the designer's maximum utility is  1 n γ . 
The second result specifies the optimal discrimination under the logit CSF. 
 
Proposition  2:  Under  the  logit  contest  success  function,  the  optimal  value  of 
discrimination  which  depends  on  the  parameters  ( ) α γ, , k ,
 
is  equal  to 










,  if  0 γ γ <   and  0
* = δ ,  otherwise,  where 
( )( ) k k γ αγ γ α 2 2 1 − − + + = Ω  and  0 γ  solves the equation  0 = Ω . 
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By Proposition 2, under the logit CSF there is no discrimination, 
* 1 δ = , for some 
intermediate political culture  e γ , where  e γ  satisfies 
* 1 δ = .
9 As expected, when γ  is 
smaller than  e γ , the equilibrium bias is in favor of contestant 2 with the lower prize 
valuation, 
α δ k ≤ <
* 1 . In such a case the bias is incomplete. Setting such a bias is 
warranted because the designer assigns a sufficiently large weight to the contestants' 
efforts  and  so  he  increases  competition  and,  in  turn,  these  efforts.  Note  that  the 
maximal bias in favor of contestant 2, 
α δ k =
* , is obtained for  0 = γ . This implies 
that for any level of discrimination, the winning probability of contestant 1 is not 
smaller than 0.5 (it is equal to 0.5 in the extreme case where  0 = γ ). This is because 
the designer's utility is more strongly affected by the performance of contestant 1: his 
effort and his expected utility. Hence, for any type of designer the winning probability 
of contestant 1, which is affected by the bias, is not smaller than that of contestant 2.  
When  γ  is larger than e γ , the equilibrium bias is in favor of the more motivated 
contestant  1.  Setting  such  a  bias  is  warranted  because  the  designer  assigns  a 
sufficiently  large  weight  to  the  contestants'  expected  utility  and  so  he  reduces 
competition, which, in turn, increases the expected welfare of the contestants. Notice 
that  0 γ γ < e
10. Therefore, when  0 e γ γ γ > > , that is, the political culture assigns a 
sufficiently high weight to the contestants' expected utility, thus inducing an interior 
equilibrium,  the  optimal  bias  in  favor  of  contestant  1  is  intermediate,  1 0
* < <δ . 
However, when  e γ γ γ > ≥ 0 , the bias in favor of contestant 1 is complete,  0
* = δ . To 
sum up, 
 
Corollary 1: Under the logit CSF,  
When  e γ γ = , 
* 1 δ = . 
When  e γ γ < , 
α δ k ≤ <
* 1 . The bias in favor of contestant 2 is maximal, 
α δ k =
* , for 
0 = γ .   
When  e γ γ > , 
* 0 1 δ ≤ < . The bias in favor of contestant 1 is maximal,  0
* = δ , for 
e γ γ γ > ≥ 0 . 
                                                 




























γ e ,  3
1 ) 1 ( = = = α γ γ e e Max . 
10 For this result see Appendix B.   10
 
By  Proposition  1,  under  the  all-pay-auction,  the  optimal  bias  can  have  only  two 
values;  k =
* δ  or  0
* = δ . The bias in favor of the less motivated contestant 2 is 
always  larger  than  or  equal  to  this  bias  under  the  logit  CSF.  Notice  that  for  a 
sufficiently large  γ , the bias under the two types of CSFs is equal,  0
* = δ , but the 
complete  bias  in  favor  of  contestant  1  under  the  all-pay-auction  requires  the 
assignment of a larger weight of the contestants' expected utility,  1 0 γ γ ≤ . 
 
4. Discrimination and changes in political culture 
Utilizing the first two propositions, we now proceed to examine how changes in the 
political culture (γ ) affect the equilibrium bias 
* δ  . 
 
Proposition 3: In an interior equilibrium of the extended contest 
11, if the CSF is of 







.  In  an  interior  and  exterior  equilibrium  of  the  extended 
contest, if the CSF is an all-pay-auction, then with the exception of a neighborhood of 








Let  us  explain  the  economic  intuition  behind  this  Proposition  using  the  formal 
findings of the Appendix. An increase in  γ  means that the designer assigns larger 
significance  to  the  public  well  being  relative  to  the  total  efforts  made  by  the 
contestants. Under the logit CSF, in equilibrium, such an increase results in more 








Consequently, aggregate efforts fall because of their reduced weight in the objective 
function of the designer. 
  Notice that a bias in favor of the contestant with the higher valuation of the 
prize  is  not  necessarily  a  bias  in  favor  of  the  richer  or  stronger  contestant.  In 
particular, if the prize is monetary and the contestants' values represent their utilities 
from the prize, then since the marginal utility of income is declining, the contestant 
                                                 
11 Since  1 ≤ α , when there is an interior equilibrium under the logit CSF,  0 γ γ < , and so there also 
exists an  interior equilibrium under the all-pay-auction because  1 γ γ < . Since  1 0 γ γ < , the former 
inequality is therefore a sufficient condition for an interior equilibrium in both cases.   11
with the higher valuation is the poorer one. In contrast, if the prize is not monetary, 
and  it  takes,  for example,  the  form  of  the  designer's  commitment  to  improve  the 
quality of the environment of one of the contestants, then it might be the case that the 
contestant  with  the  higher  prize  valuation  is  the  richer  one  (assuming  that  a  rich 
individual values environmental quality more than a poor individual). In light of these 
two  examples,  if  the  CSF  is  of  the  logit  form,  Proposition  3  has  two  alternative 
interpretations. If the higher prize valuation is due to lower income (the first example 
above),  then  the  increase  in  γ   intensifies  affirmative  action  (
* δ   is  reduced).  If, 
however,  the  higher  prize  valuation  characterizes  the  "stronger"  (wealthier, 
privileged) contestant (the second example above), the increase in γ  can be viewed as 
weakening affirmative action in our contest setting. 
  Under  an  all-pay-auction,  if  γ   is  sufficiently  small,  1 γ γ < ,  the  designer 
assigns more significance to the total efforts of the contestants. Again, in this case the 
optimal bias  k =
* δ  accomplishes the designer's attempt to maximize the extent of 
competition between the contestants. In fact, such bias eliminates the advantage of 
contestant  1,  creates  actual  equality  between  the  competitors  and  completely 
eliminates  their  surplus.  Therefore  the  utility  of  each  contestants  is  zero  and  the 
corresponding value of the designer's objective function, whose utility depends only 
on the expected aggregate efforts of the contestants in the mixed-strategy equilibrium 
of  the  contest,  is  ( )( ) 2 1
* 1 5 . 0 n n GA + − = γ .  Thus,  in  equilibrium,  the  utility  of  the 
designer  is  equal  to  the  average  prize  valuation  times  the  weight  assigned  to  the 
expected efforts. In contrast to the case of the logit CSF, under an all-pay-auction the 
contest is deterministic, and, in turn, the behavior of the designer is binary: for low 
values of γ ,  k =
* δ . For high values of γ ,  0
* = δ . Consequently, when γ  increases, 
and the equilibrium strategy of the designer is interior, his optimal discrimination 
remains  k =
* δ .  This is due to the fact that the aggregate expected utility of  the 
contestants remains zero and the weight assigned to total efforts, which also remain 
unchanged,  is  reduced.  Note  that  when  γ   increases,  the  designer  can  change  his 
strategy from  k =
* δ  to  0
* = δ . In such a case contestant 1 wins the prize without 
making any effort and the designer's utility becomes  1
* n GL γ = . This utility is still 
lower than the reduced utility that is equal to (1 γ − ) multiplied by the equilibrium 
aggregate efforts corresponding to  k =
* δ  because  γ  is small. That is, despite the   12
reduction in his utility, when γ  increases, the designer prefers this reduced utility to 
the still lower utility obtained for  0
* = δ . 
 
5. Discrimination and changes in prize valuations 
Let  us  examine  how  changes  in  the  asymmetry  in  prize  valuations  (k)  affect  the 
equilibrium bias 
* δ  and the utility of the contest designer.  
 
Proposition 4:   
1.  In an interior  equilibrium of the extended contest under  the  logit CSF, an 
increase in k has an equivocal effect on the equilibrium discrimination 
* δ . 






























. In particular,  1









2.  In an interior equilibrium of the extended contest under an all-pay-auction, if 
1 γ γ <  (see Proposition 1), then an increase in k results in an increase in the 

















γ , an increase in k increases the bias in favor 







. The reason for this is the 
designer's desire to make the competition more aggressive because of the large weight 
assigned to the contestants' efforts. Notice that the increase in the bias favoring the 
contestant with the lower prize valuation is relative to the situation where the bias δ  

















and  increases  expected  utility  of  the  contestant  with  the  lower  prize  valuation, 
                                                 






Max  and, therefore, if  γ < 3














.  However,  the  aggregate  expected  utility  of  the  contestants  declines, 









u E u E
.
13  Relative  to  the  (inferior)  situation  where  δ   remains 
unchanged, the designer's utility is larger because the positive effect of the increased 
efforts  due  to  the  increased  bias  in  favor  of  the  contestant  with  the  lower  prize 
valuation dominates the negative effect of the reduced aggregate expected utility of 
the  contestants.  Note  that  the  last  claim  does  not  imply  that  the  designer's  utility 
always  increases.  In  particular,  when  2 n   is  reduced,  and  the  designer  responds 







GL ; nevertheless, it is still larger 
relatively to his utility in the situation where  2 n  declines, yet δ  remains unchanged. 





, an increase in k, the asymmetry between the 








.  The  reason  for  this  is  the  designer's  attempt  to  make  the 
competition less aggressive because of the large weight assigned to the contestants' 
expected utility.  
  As  explained  in  the  discussion  following  Corollary  1,  under  an  all-pay-
auction, the nature of the contest is binary and therefore when k increases and the 
equilibrium  is  interior,  1 γ γ < ,  the  designer  becomes  more  biased  in  favor  of  the 







,  in  order  to  equalize  the 
contestants'  chances  of  winning,  and  thus  induce  them  to  increase  their  efforts 
relatively to the case where the bias remains unchanged (equal to its value before the 

























,  which  means  that  the 
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. Relative 
                                                  
13  For these results see Appendix B.   14
to the situation where  δ  is not changed, the net effect on the designer's utility is 
positive because the increase in utility due to the increased efforts of the contestants 
dominates  the  reduced  expected  utility  of  the  contestant  with  the  higher  prize 
valuation. The increased bias in favor of contestant 2 increases the designer's utility 
relative to the situation where he leaves the bias intact in response to the increase in k. 
Again,  note  that  this  claim  does  not  imply  that  the  designer's  utility  necessarily 
increases. In particular, when  2 n  declines and the designer responds optimally by 








GA ; nevertheless, it is still larger 
relative to his utility in the situation where  2 n  declines, yet  δ  remains unchanged. 
Also note that a change in a contestant's prize valuation positively affects the utility of 
the contest designer, provided that the political culture (the value of the parameter γ ) 
is associated with an interior equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 4': In an interior equilibrium, an increase in  i n , i=(1,2) increases the 
utility of the contest designer. 
 
6. The superiority of the all-pay-auction 
In the literature, the CSF is usually assumed to be of the logit or all-pay-auction type. 
By Propositions 1 and 2, we get that an all-pay-auction is always the superior CSF.  
 
Proposition 5: For any  γ , the contest designer's utility under the all-pay-auction is 
larger than or equal to his utility under the logit CSF. 
 
This final result provides a new political-economic micro foundation to some of the 
most  commonly  used  models  in  the  contest  literature.  It  supports  the  common 
assumption  that  the  CSF  is  an  all-pay-auction  because  this  CSF  emerges  as  an 
equilibrium  strategy  in  the  extended  game  where  the  contest  designer  chooses 
between these two types of CSFs as well as determines the nature of the contest, that 
is, the bias in favor of one of the contestants. The contrast between Proposition 5 and 
Proposition 2 in Fang (2002) is due to his different model where no discrimination 
(exogenous or endogenous) is allowed and  1 = α . The contrast between Proposition 5 
and Proposition 3 in Che and Gale (1997), where the lottery contest may generate   15
higher expected effort if the asymmetry is large, is caused by several differences in 
their  modeling.  Although  they  do  not  allow  (exogenous  or  endogenous) 
discrimination or asymmetry in the contestants' prize valuations, they assume that the 
contestants have budget constraints. This implies that there is asymmetry between the 
differences between a contestant's prize valuation and the wealth of the second to the 
richest  contestant  which  is  critical  in  determining  equilibrium  under  the  all-pay-
auction.   
 
7. Conclusion 
This  study  contributes  new  insights  to  the  political  economy  of  discrimination  in 
contests. It demonstrates that political culture and asymmetry in the contested prize 
valuations are useful explanatory factors for understanding the diversity in the extent 
of discrimination in different societies. As we have seen, in the real complex contest 
environments, discrimination is often controlled by contest designers. The objective 
of our contest designer reflects his political culture and one could empirically test for 
our hypotheses on the nature of discrimination in contests by considering different 
types  of  contests  carried  out  over  different  periods  of  time  by  different  political 
parties or different government officials in power. By doing so one could expose, in 
particular, the political culture that inspires the existing bias in the existing contests 
(whether the discrimination is in favor of the contestant with the low or high prize 
valuation).  
  Focusing on the two most widely studied types of contest success functions 
(CSFs), deterministic all-pay-auctions and logit CSFs, we specify in Propositions 1 
and 2 the relationship between discrimination in contests and the prevailing political 
culture (the weights assigned to the expected aggregate utility of the contestants and 
to their total efforts) as well as the asymmetry in the contestants' prize valuations. 
Under the logit CSF, we then derive in Corollary 1 the conditions that determine 
whether the optimal bias is in favor of the contestant with the larger or smaller prize 
valuation. It turns out that bias in favor of the more motivated contestant is driven by 
the assignment of sufficiently large weight to the expected utility of the contestants. In 
such a case, the contest designer wishes to increase the winning probability of the 
contestant with the larger prize valuation. Such an increase is sufficient to positively 
affect the total expected utility of the contestants. Bias in favor of the contestant with 
the  lower  motivation  is  due  to  the  assignment  of  sufficiently  large  weight  to  the   16
contestants'  efforts.  In  such  a  case,  the  contest  designer  wishes  to  equalize  the 
"strength" of the contestants and increase the extent of competition in order to induce 
the contestants to make larger efforts. We proceed by establishing in Proposition 3 
that  under  a  logit  CSF,  the  bias  in  favor  of  the  contestant  with  the  higher  prize 
valuation is increasing in the weight assigned to the expected utility of the contestants. 
Under an all-pay-auction, since the equilibrium bias can take only two values (k or 0), 
the bias in favor of the more motivated contestant is almost always invariant to a 
change  in  the  weight  assigned  to  the  contestants'  expected  utility.  The  effect  of 
valuation asymmetry on the optimal bias is ambiguous. By Proposition 4, the bias in 
favor of the more motivated contestant is decreasing (non-decreasing) in valuation 
asymmetry provided that the weight assigned to the expected utility of the contestants 
is sufficiently small (large). By the last result, Proposition 5, an all-pay auction is 
always  preferred  to  a  logit  CSF  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  contest  designer, 
provided that the logit CSF is of decreasing or constant returns to scale. This finding 
provides  a  new  political-economic  micro  rationalization  to  some  of  the  most 
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Appendix A 
Proof Proposition 1: When  0 2 1 ≥ − n n δ , in a mixed-strategy equilibrium, under any 









  and 







n GA .  Since  the  inequality  ( ) 0 1 3 1 > − + − γ γ k   is 








, we get the following result: 
1. If  1 γ γ < , then the optimal discrimination is the maximal  δ  consistent with the 
constraint  0 2 1 ≥ − n n δ , which is  k n n = = 2 1
* / δ . This is an interior equilibrium of 
the extended all-pay-auction. 
2. If  1 γ γ ≥ , then the optimal discrimination is  0
* = δ , that is the prize is awarded to 
the contestant with the higher prize valuation without a contest.               Q.E.D 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: In equilibrium  





























































































u E  
The second order conditions of equilibrium require that  ( ) 2 , 1 , 0 /
2 2 = < ∂ ∂ i x u E i i  and 
the contestants' payoffs must be non-negative, that is,  ( ) 0
* ≥ i u E  which requires  
0 ) 1 ( ≥ − + δ α
α k  and  0 ) 1 ( ≥ − +
α α δ k . 
A sufficient condition for the above four conditions to be satisfied is that  1 ≤ α . The 
designer's maximal utility is therefore equal to: 
(8)
 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( )















1 1 1 ) 1 (
δ




k k k k k
n GL  
Suppose  that  the  equilibrium  discrimination  level  set  by  the  contest  designer  is 
interior, that is,  0
* > δ  (later on we examine the possibility of  0
* = δ ). In such a case   20





.  This  implies  that  the  optimal  bias 
chosen by the designer is equal to: 
(9)    ( )( ) [ ]
( )( ) ( ) Ω + −
Ω
=
− + + + −
− + + + −
=
1 2 2 1 2





γ αγ γ α γ




The second order condition for this interior equilibrium is; 













αγ γ α γ
δ α k
k GL  which is satisfied if: 
(10)    ( )( ) 0 2 1 2 > − + + + − αγ γ α γ k  
Hence,  the  existence  of  an  interior  equilibrium  bias,  0
* > δ ,  requires  that  the 
nominator in (9) is also positive. That is, 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 > − + + − + = − + + + − = Ω α α γ α αγ γ α γ k k k k  
Since  1 > k , we get that  ( ) 0 1 2 2 1 > − + + α α k , which implies that the nominator in 
(9) is positive if:   




















This inequality requires that  5 . 0 < γ . If condition (11) is not satisfied  ( ) 1 0 ≤ ≤γ γ , 
then  0
* = δ , which means that contestant 1 is awarded the prize without any contest. 
In such a case  1
* n GL γ = . Since  1 > k , inequality (11) implies that the SOC is satisfied. 
An interior equilibrium therefore exists if and only if: 





















                              Q.E.D 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: Under the logit CSF, in an interior equilibrium,  
( )( )



























, let us examine the effect of γ  in 
an interior equilibrium on the efforts of the contestants, their winning probability and 
their expected utility. Substituting 
* δ (see (9)) in (5) – (7) we get:    21
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Remark: From (13) and (14) one could erroneously deduce that when γ  converges to 
0.5, 
*
L G  and 
*
i x converge, respectively, to infinity and minus infinity. Let us show 
that, in fact, in an interior equilibrium  1
* 5 . 0 n GL <  and  i i n x α 25 . 0 0
* < < . The reason 
for this is that one has to take into account that in an interior equilibrium inequality 
(12) is satisfied. More specifically, since for any combination of the parameters, in an   22






























































































we  get 
that  1




























converges to zero. If α  is given,  1 0 ≤ <α , the expression converges to zero provided 
that  k  converges  to  1.  This  means  that  for  high  values  of  k  the  condition  is  not 
satisfied. Hence,  γ  will converge to 0.5 and there will exist an interior equilibrium 
only  when k  is sufficiently small  (approaching 1). One  cannot ask therefore what 
happens to 
*
L G  when  γ  converges to 0.5, without taking into account that in such a 
case the permissible combinations of k and α  are reduced. As to 
*
i x , by inequality 
(12)  the  expression  within  the  parenthesis  { }  in  (14)  is  positive  and,  therefore, 
i i n x α 25 . 0 0
* < < . For the same reason, the winning probabilities in (17) and (18) are 
between 0 and 1. 
When the CSF is an all-pay-auction, using the proof of Proposition 1 we get 
the following result: 





1 * δ .  In  this  case, 
( )( ) 2 1







 and  ( ) 0 5 . 0 2 1
*







2. If  1 γ γ ≥ ,  then  the  optimal  discrimination  is  0
* = δ .  In  this  case,  1
















                                                                     
Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Proposition 4: Let us examine the effect of a change in k,  1 n  and  2 n  on 
* δ  
at an interior equilibrium under the logit CSF:   23
( ) [ ]( ) ( ) { }
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. To prove the validity of this claim, notice that 
1 > k  implies that  ( ) k k 4 1
2 > + . Therefore, if  ( )
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The last expression is positive, provided that  ( ) γ γ α > −2 1








γ . Since 







































. To prove the validity of this claim, notice that 
1 > k  implies that  ( ) k k 4 1
2 > + . Therefore, if  ( )






, then:  
( ) [ ] ( ) { }
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The  last  expression  is  negative  when  ( ) γ γ α < −2 1








γ .  Since 





















. In particular, this 
implies that for  γ < 3













Max  and, therefore, if 
γ < 3













Let us examine now the effect of a change in  1 n  on  1 x  . 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) [ ] k k k k k
k n
x
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γ . Let us prove 
















,  as  proved  above.  Since  1 ≤ α ,  ( ) 1 5 3 1 3 3
2 3 2 2 3 + − + > + + + k k k k k k α , 
which is equivalent to the following inequalities: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) [ ] 1 4 1 1 1
2 2 3 − + − − > + k k k k k α ;  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 4 1 1 1
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Let us proceed with the examination of the effect of a change in  2 n  on  2 x . Notice that 
inequality (12) is equivalent to the inequality: 
( ) ( ) ( )γ γ α 1 2 1 1 − > − + k k  ⇔   ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 γ γ α − > − + k k  
Since  ( ) 0 1 4
2 > − k kγ , we get that 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) { } 0 1 4 1 2 1 1 1
1 2 1
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Consider next the effect of a change in  j n on 
*
i x . 




































































, we get that 
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By these results one can see that the effect of a change in  2 n  on total  efforts is 











, but the effect of a change in  1 n  is ambiguous. 
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Hence,  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 3 1 2 1 1
2 2 2 2 + − > − + k k k γ γ α ⇔ ( )( ) [ ]
( )

























































,  as  shown 
above. Since  1 ≤ α
 
,  ( ) 1 2 3 2
2 2 2 + + < − + k k k k α , which is equivalent to: 
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. Consider now the effect of changes in  1 n  and  2 n  
on  L G .    ( ) ( ) [ ] { }( ) ( ) [ ] { }
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Both of these two last terms are positive, because due to the second order conditions, 
( ) ( ) [ ] 0 2 2 1 1 > − + − + γ γ γ α k   and  in  an  interior  equilibrium, 
( ) ( ) [ ] 0 2 2 1 1 > − + − + k k γ γ γ α .                                                                              Q.E.D 
 
Proof of Proposition 5:  


















γ ,  (the  necessary  condition  for an  interior  equilibrium 

















































γ , then  k =
* δ  and  ( )( ) 1 1 5 . 0 2
* + − = k n GA γ  . Let us 
prove that in this case, we always obtain that 
* *
A L G G < :   26
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 (which exceeds γ , because we consider interior equilibria under the 
logit CSF) increases with α . Since, for any α ,  1 0 ≤ <α , we get that  ( ) α α α ≥ − 2 . 

































γ  which means that 
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,  then  under  the  logit  CSF  0
* = δ   in 
which  case  1
* n GL γ =   and  under  the  all-pay-auction  k =
* δ   and 

















γ  is equivalent to 
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γ , then under the two CSFs  0
* = δ  and in both cases we get 
that  1
* * n G G L A γ = = .                     Q.E.D 
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. By (9), when  0 > γ
, in an interior equilibrium, 
* δ
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